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I. A BOTCHED LAUNCH
THE MASSIVE Titan III rocket sat on the launch pad
while technicians, working furiously on the nose cone
assembly, prepared the Intelsat spacecraft for its long
journey to geosynchronous orbit.' Unfortunately, the
telecommunications satellite never reached its final desti-
nation. A Martin Marietta2 technician, responsible for
mating the satellite to its orbital booster, mistakenly wired
the deployment mechanism for a pair of satellites rather
than for the intended single satellite. At the critical time
of deployment of both the satellite and its Payload Assist
Module (PAM), the resulting computer commands failed
to eject the cargo from the second stage of the Titan III.
After several minutes, the confused ground control team
finally managed to separate the payload from the rocket.
The telecommunications satellite, originally designed to
perch 22,300 miles above the equator, fell uselessly into
low Earth orbit. Intelsat claimed that the failure of the
Martin Marietta ground crew to detect a key wiring error
caused the late separation.4 In a suit for declaratory judg-
ment, a federal district court found Martin Marietta free
from liability for negligence or even gross negligence.5
The court based this decision on the public policy an-
For a general account of the facts surrounding the loss of the Intelsat satellite,
see Mark A. Hofmann, Intelsat Sues Satellite Launch Firm; Seeks $400 Million for
Botched Launch, Bus. INs., Sept. 17, 1990, at 3, and Intelsat Blasts Martin Marietta in
Lawsuit Comments: Suit Over Intelsat 6 Communications Satellite Accident, SATELLITE
NEWS, Dec. 3, 1990, at 6.
2 Martin Marietta Corp. is a large aerospace firm that builds the Titan III
rocket.
3 See Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Motion to Dismiss Counterclaim at
14, Martin Marietta Corp. v. Intelsat, 763 F. Supp. 1327 (D. Md. 1991) (No. MJG
90-1840) [hereinafter Martin Marietta Memorandum].
4 Intelsat claims Martin Marietta "miswired the launch vehicle so that the satel-
lite did not and could not separate from the launch vehicle in response to com-
mands sent by the Martin Marietta flight computer." Memorandum in Opposition
to Plaintiff's Motion to Dismiss Counterclaims at 2, Martin Marietta Corp. v. Intel-
sat, 763 F. Supp. 1327 (D. Md. 1991) (No. MJG 90-1840) [hereinafter Intelsat
Memorandum].
5 Martin Marietta Corp. v. International Telecommunications Satellite Org.,
763 F. Supp. 1327 (D. Md. 199 1), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 978 F.2d 140 (4th Cir.
1992).
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nounced in the 1988 Amendments 6 (Amendments) to the
original Commercial Space Launch Act of 1984 (CSLA).7
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit reversed the dismissal of
gross negligence claims, but upheld the dismissal of negli-
gent and negligent misrepresentation claims based on the
sophistication of the parties.8
Almost ten years before the Martin Marietta mishap,
the National Aeronautics and Space Administration
(NASA) and the Reagan administration began to en-
courage the development of a private commercial space
launch industry.9 Following the first private launch of the
Conestoga I, President Reagan demanded and obtained
the CSLA, which consolidated and streamlined the com-
mercial launch licensing procedure.10 In 1986, the Chal-
lenger disaster painfully exposed the unworkable
inconsistencies between NASA's original charter to de-
velop space technology" and a more recent endeavor to
operate a viable commercial launch system.' 2  Only
6 49 U.S.C. app. §§ 2601-2623 (1988) (public policy to encourage the strug-
gling commercial launch industry).
Commercial Space Launch Act of 1984, 49 U.S.C. app. §§ 2601-2623 (1988).
a Martin Marietta v. International Communications Satellite Org., 978 F.2d 140
at 146 (4th Cir. 1992).
9 See infra part II.B.
10 See infra part IV.B.
I National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-568, 72 Stat. 426
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2451-2484 (1988)). The legislative history
accompanying the Act explains the original role of NASA:
The bill establishes a new civilian agency ... to develop a compre-
hensive program of research and development in aeronautical and
space sciences and related matters (including the study and solution
of the problems of manned and unmanned flight within and outside
the earth's atmosphere and the development, construction, testing,
and operation for research purposes of aircraft, missiles, satellites, and
other space vehicles).
H.R. REP. No. 1770, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958), reprinted in 1958 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3160, 3171 (emphasis added).
12 By 1970, NASA was launching more payloads for other organizations such as
COMSAT, the Department of Defense, and foreign corporations, than for itself.
ROGER E. BILSTEIN, ORDERS OF MAGNITUDE, A HISTORY OF THE NACA AND NASA,
1915-1990, at 98 (1989). The NASA appropriations bill for fiscal year 1984 re-
flects later efforts by both NASA and Congress to establish the Shuttle program as
a more economically self-sufficient enterprise.
Space Shuttle Marketing. Technical evolution of the space shuttle has
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months after the Challenger disaster, the Reagan Admin-
istration drastically curtailed commercial use of the Shut-
tle, giving birth to the private expendable launch vehicle
(ELV) industry.' 3 Finally, in 1988, to save a small and
shrinking group of private launch companies, Congress
adopted the Amendments to ameliorate the insurance and
liability problems plaguing the young industry.' 4 The dis-
trict court in Martin Marietta relied on the Amendments to
dismiss all tort claims and deferred solely to the contract
between the parties as a basis of liability. 5 On appeal, the
Fourth Circuit reaffirmed the importance of the contract
in space launches, but reversed the dismissal of gross neg-
ligence. 16 This recent decision reviving gross negligence
may fly in the face of the legislative purpose of the
Amendments and send a chilling signal to the private
space launch community that tort may not be dead in
space. The impact of these recent court decisions is criti-
cal to a young industry estimated to generate 35 million
progressed sufficiently such that the development of the full poten-
tial for marketing the system needs to receive senior NASA manage-
ment attention. The Committee [on Science and Technology]
believes that NASA should use the expertise of the private sector to
develop an effective marketing approach. Effective marketing of
space shuttle capabilities to commercial and foreign customers
should serve to decrease the government's share of operational
costs and assure that the shuttle system achieves the full potential
for which it was developed.
H.R. REP. No. 65, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1983).
11 Statement by President Reagan, 22 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1103-04 (Aug.
15, 1986) ("It has been determined ... that NASA will no longer be in the busi-
ness of launching private satellites."). Two recent decisions issued by the United
States Claims Court denied recovery to plaintiff satellite owners seeking losses as
a result of the President's action. In Hughes Communications Galaxy, Inc. v.
United States, 26 Cl. Ct. 123 (1992), plaintiffs alleged damages of $288,454,000
after NASA announced that they could no longer launch ten Hughes satellites
under a launch services agreement signed by Hughes and the United States in
1985. Id. at 125. The court found that Hughes could expect no more than what
the contract offered and dismissed the contention that the President's change in
Shuttle policy amounted to a taking of property. Id. at 146. Similarly, in Ameri-
can Satellite Co. v. United States, 26 Cl. Ct. 146 (1992), the court reaffirmed the
President's constitutional power to dictate space policy. Id. at 160.
11 See infra part IV.C.
15 Martin Marietta, 763 F. Supp. at 1334.
16 Martin Marietta, 978 F.2d at 145-46.
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jobs and a one trillion dollar global economy by the year
2010.17
This comment first explores the history of the space
launch industry, emphasizing U.S. efforts to encourage
the industry through deregulation and public policy pro-
nouncements. Next, it traces the development of launch-
ers' liability for damaged or lost payloads, from the strict
tort liability to the recent legislation mandating cross-
waivers of liability among all launch participants. The
comment then discusses two congressional efforts to clear
major hurdles impeding the growth of the private space
launch industry: (1) consolidation of the licensing process
in the original CSLA and (2) elimination of space insur-
ance and liability problems in the Amendments. Finally,
the comment considers the current state of regulation in
light of recent court decisions and offers final comments
on the future of the commercial space launch industry.
II. NASA: FROM EXPLORATION TO
EXPLOITATION
A. THE EARLY YEARS
NASA possessed complete control over domestic access
to space from the launch of the Explorer in 1958 until the
privately financed launch of the Conestoga I on Septem-
ber 9, 1982."8 During this time, space activities concen-
trated primarily on exploration and research of space,' 9
but the recent Shuttle program shifted its focus to the
commercial development of space.20 This transition from
'17 Diane D. Edwards, Giving Space the Business, 128 Sci. NEWs 392, 392 (1985).
From 1957-1980, the nations of the world spent over $240 billion on space activi-
ties. Art Dula, Private Sector Activities in Outer Space, 19 INT'L LAW 159, 163 (1985).
Is Kim G. Yelton, Evolution, Organization and Implementation of the Commercial Space
Launch Act and Amendments of 1988, 4 J.L. & TECH. 117, 117 (1989).
19 Karl-Heinz Bockstiegel, Commercial Space Activities: Their Growing Influence on
Space Law, 12 ANNALS AIR & SPACE L. 175, 175 (1987). "At that time, the commer-
cial use of space was little more than the stuff of science fiction novels." Hughes
Communications Galaxy, Inc. v. United States, 26 Cl. Ct. 123, 125-26 (1992).
In the early 1980s, NASA began to sell space on the Shuttle to commercial
entities to help fund the young and extremely expensive program. Hughes, 26 Cl.
1993] 799
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government exploration to private exploitation created
many problems. For instance, NASA's original adminis-
trative purpose was to develop and perfect space technol-
ogy and to allow private enterprise and the free markets
to assess the commercial usefulness of this technology.2 '
The Shuttle program drastically shifted these priorities.
B. A Two-FACED SPACE SHU'rLE
NASA's Space Shuttle program began as a purely gov-
ernmental endeavor. At the ceremonies following the re-
turn of Space Shuttle Columbia in 1982, President
Reagan announced a policy to encourage the domestic
commercial use of space. The Presidential Space Policy
declared the Shuttle to be the "primary space launch sys-
tem for both national security and civil government mis-
sions."' 23  At the same time, the policy promised to
"provide a climate conducive to expanded private sector
investment and involvement in space activities. 24
NASA responded to Reagan's Presidential Directive
with its own Commercial Space Policy (NCSP). 25  The
NCSP identifies technical, financial and institutional risks
Ct. at 125. NASA attracted commercial clients with an attractive pricing plan and
the catchy advertising slogan "We Deliver." Id.
21 National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, 42 U.S.C. § 2451 (1988); Barry
D. Johnson, Spacecraft Insurance-An Overview and Proposal, 36 FED'N INS. & CORP.
COUNS. Q 247, 267 (1986).
22 United States Space Policy, 18 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 872 (July 4, 1982)
[hereinafter Presidential Directive]. The directive was incorporated into national
executive policy by Presidential/National Security Council NSC-42, July 4, 1982
(Subject: Civil and Further National Space Policy). See James R. Myers, Federal
Government Regulation of Commercial Operations Using Expendable Launch Vehicles, 12 J.
SPACE L. 40, 40 n.l (1984).
23 Presidential Directive, supra note 22, at 873.
24 Id. at 874. Despite these earlier efforts to encourage development of a pri-
vate commercial space launch industry, not until the events following the Chal-
lenger disaster did the market open up for private launch operators. The
President removed the Shuttle from commercial operations, which immediately
spawned a private ELV industry. See American Satellite Co. v. United States, 26
Cl. Ct. 146, 156 (1992).
25 Michele R. Lamontagne, Note, United States Commercial Space Policy: Impact on
International and Domestic Law, 13 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & CoM. 129, 140 (1986)
(citing National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Commercial Use of Space
Policy (Oct. 29, 1984) [hereinafter NCSP]).
[58
SPACE LAUNCH TORTS
to the private launch industry and proposes several initia-
tives to reduce these barriers.2 6 The implementation of
these initiatives achieves five underlying goals, which are:
(1) better communication with the private sector; (2) non-
intervention in private investment decisions; (3) support
of private space projects that are more efficient than gov-
ernment operations; (4) investment in research and facili-
ties to encourage private investment; and (5) assistance
with private sector endeavors offering potential benefits
for the nation. 27 Furthermore, NASA called for the elimi-
nation of any laws inconsistent with the policies of the
NCSP. 2a
Following the Presidential Directive and the NCSP, the
U.S. government tried to wean the private sector from the
launch services provided by NASA and the Air Force. In
1983 NASA discontinued its participation in the Delta and
Atlas/Centaur launch systems.2 9 Increased demand for
satellite launch services and an anticipated reduction in
the Shuttle commercial manifest led several entities, like
the French Ariane system, to begin aggressively market-
ing their launch services to U.S. companies.3 0 The Shut-
tle's sophistication, which drove the cost of putting a one
pound payload into orbit from $3800 for the Saturn V to
over $6000 for the Shuttle, provided additional impetus
for new launch companies to enter the market.3 '
NASA, however, in apparent conflict with the Presiden-
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 Id. at 149-50.
29 Space Commercialization: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Space Science and Applica-
tions of the House Comm. on Science and Technology, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 250, 285
(1983) [hereinafter House Space Commercialization Hearings]. Although McDonnell
Douglas builds the Delta launch system and General Dynamics builds the Atlas/
Centaur launch system, NASA actually purchased the launch vehicles, arranged
the payload manifest, and managed the entire launch activity. Douglas A. Hey-
don, International Trade and Launch Pricing, 38 FED. BAR NEWS &J. 140, 140 (Apr.
1991). NASA pulled all of the participants together and directly billed the cus-
tomer for the launch services. Id.
10 House Space Commercialization Hearings, supra note 29, at 285.
3t EDWARD L. HUDGINS, AMERICA'S SPACE POLICY: COUNTDOWN TO MAJOR RE-
FORMS, (Heritage Found. Rep. No. 826 (Apr. 25, 1991)).
1993]
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tial Directive of 1982 and their own policy of encouraging
private sector launch capabilities, continued marketing its
launch services to private vendors.3 2 One course, sup-
ported by the Presidential Directive and NASA's own
space policy, encouraged independent development of a
private launch industry and reserved the Shuttle for spe-
cial missions.3 Another course, spurred on by the unique
capabilities of the Shuttle and NASA's strong desire to in-
volve private industry in the Shuttle program, pressured
NASA to establish the commercial feasibility of the
Shuttle. 34
C. CONESTOGA I: PIONEER OF THE PRIVATE INDUSTRY
On September 9, 1982, despite NASA's virtual monop-
oly on commercial space launches, a small group of entre-
preneurs successfully launched a modified Minuteman I
second-stage missile, the Conestoga I, from Matagorda Is-
land, Texas.3 5 The launch of the Conestoga I was not a
technological miracle, but it represented the first Ameri-
can launch that did not involve direct government partici-
pation. 6 This private commercial space effort revealed
the inadequacies of both the existing federal laws and the
agencies overseeing purely private launches. 7 Because
either NASA or the Air Force had handled all of the com-
mercial launches to date, the particular controls for a
32 NASA's "We Deliver" campaign was a success and resulted in 24 commercial
launches between 1982 and 1986 with a backlog of 44 additional payloads at the
time of the Challenger disaster. Hughes, 26 Cl. Ct. at 128, NASA, concerned with
the competition from the European ELV company Arianespace, also instituted a
new pricing policy in 1985 to improve the "international competitive position of
the United States." 42 U.S.C. § 2466a(4) (1985); Charlotte Rothenberg, Space,
The Final Frontier: To Boldly Go Where No Lawyer Has Gone Before, 38 FED. BAR NEWS
&J. 127, 127 (April 1991).
" Hughes, 26 Cl. Ct. at 129-32.
34 Lamontagne, supra note 25, at 149-50.
35 Stephen Harrigan, Mr. Hannah's Rocket, TEX. MONTHLY, Nov. 1982, at 168.
16 Francis H. Esposito, Jr., The Commercial Exploitation of Space, 25 A.F. L. REV.
159, 159 (1985).
37 Yelton, supra note 18, at 119. For a recount of the harrowing experience to
receive permission to launch the Conestoga I, see Dula, supra note 17, at 179-81.
A less legalese treatment of the launch appears in Harrigan, supra note 35, at 168.
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launch were found in launch service agreements executed
between the commercial user and the government, not in
federal legislation.3 8 No single law addressed a purely
private venture. To receive government approval to
launch the Conestoga I, Space Services, Inc. negotiated
with nearly twenty federal agencies.3 9 To alleviate these
inefficiencies, President Reagan issued an Executive Or-
der designating the Department of Transportation (DOT)
as the lead agency responsible for licensing commercial
space ventures.40
In response to the President's Order, Congress passed
the CSLA, which established the Office of Commercial
Space Transportation (OCST) and set forth guidelines to
regulate and license private space launch ventures. 4' The
new office attempted to deregulate and promote the in-
dustry while maintaining control over national security is-
sues, insurance requirements, and payload monitoring.4 2
In the words of Elizabeth Dole, Secretary of Transporta-
tion, the commercial space launch industry was now
"open for business. 43
D. THE CHALLENGER DISASTER AND BEYOND
The commercial space launch industry may have been
open for business, but the business was still run by NASA
38 See infra part III.D.
-9 Commercial Space Launch Act: Hearings on S. 2931 Before the Subcomm. on Science,
Technology, and Space of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 98th
Cong., 1st Sess. 32, 66 (1984) [hereinafter Senate CSLA Hearings].
40 Exec. Order No. 12,465, 49 Fed. Reg. 7211 (1984), reprinted in 42 U.S.C.
§ 2465 note (1988).
4, 49 U.S.C. app. §§ 2601-2623 (1988). Some NASA officials opposed creation
of the OCST, fearing that a decrease in commercial users on the Shuttle would
lead to budget cuts in NASA programs. Hughes, 26 Cl. Ct. at 130. The tension
mounted as NASA strived to develop a commercially feasible launch system in the
Shuttle while the President and Congress sought to encourage the floundering
ELV industry. Id.
42 William L. Slover, Space Is the Place, 51 I.C.C. PRAC. J. 416, 416 (1984) (state-
ment by Robert Ross, senior attorney in the DOT general counsel's office, speak-
ing before an American Bar Association forum on space and aviation law).
41 Id. (statement by Elizabeth Dole, Secretary of Transportation, Expendable
Launch Vehicle Order Ceremony, The White House (Feb. 24, 1984)).
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and its rival, Arianespace.4 4 NASA had begun a banner
year, including a record fifteen scheduled flights, when
Challenger left the Kennedy Space Center launch pad on
January 28, 1986. 45 Moments later, a faulty 0-ring caused
a spectacular explosion, killing all seven astronauts and
ending NASA's misguided efforts to develop an economi-
cally viable commercial launch system.46 The Rogers
Commission, appointed by President Reagan, revealed
that NASA's decision-making process was unnecessarily
encumbered by commercial pressures to meet ambitious
launch schedules. 47  The accident sparked immediate ex-
ecutive action, which shifted the burden of commercial
space development to struggling private entrepreneurs
and their expendable launch vehicles (ELVs).48
14 Heydon, supra note 29, at 140. By the end of 1985 the young Ariane pro-
gram already boasted a backlog of 41 launch contracts, many with customers
outside of Europe. Id.
45 Lamontagne, supra note 25, at 149.
46 David E. Sanger, Loss a Further Blow to NASA's Business Efforts, N.Y. TIMES,Jan.
30, 1986, at AI9.
41 Lamontagne, supra note 25, at 152. The Challenger explosion highlighted
the inadequacy of the program as a dependable and cost-effective commercial
launch provider. Id. Although the original purpose of the Space Shuttle was to
provide a launch system for both national security and civil government missions,
the Shuttle program felt increasing pressure to prove its economic viability as a
commercial carrier up until the Challenger disaster. REPORT OF THE PRESIDENTIAL
COMMISSION ON THE SPACE SHUTTLE CHALLENGER ACCIDENT 82 (June 6, 1986).
The Rogers Commission reported that emphasis on "operational" as opposed to
"developmental" goals caused increasing pressure to launch, sometimes sacrific-
ing safety concerns. Id. at 164-65. Both NASA officials and employees of Morton
Thiokol expressed concern that the "O-rings" in the solid rocket boosters may fail
if temperatures reached below 53 degrees Fahrenheit. Id. at 82. The temperature
at the time the Challenger left the launch pad was 37 degrees. Hughes, 26 Cl. Ct.
at 129.
48 Heydon, supra note 29, at 140. The President stated: The private sector, with
its ingenuity and cost effectiveness, will be playing an increasingly important role
in the American space effort. Free enterprise corporations will become a highly
competitive method of launching commercial satellites and doing those things
which do not require a manned presence in space. Statement by President Rea-
gan, 22 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1104 (Aug. 15, 1986). Following the Chal-
lenger incident and the executive pronouncement severely limiting commercial
launches on the Shuttle, the U.S. government discovered the difficulty involved in
transferring launch services to the private industry. Hughes, 26 Cl. Ct. at 131. The
President's Economic Policy Council categorized the 44 remaining commercial
payloads, but only 20 qualified as national security, foreign policy, or Shuttle-
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Ironically, the Shuttle disaster provided opportunities
for the private sector to enter the launch market, but at
the same time discouraged participation by increasing
space insurance premiums.4 9 To add to this dilemma, the
European Space Agency's Ariane rocket fleet already of-
fered dependable and relatively inexpensive launch serv-
ices, which lured several American companies away from
domestic operations." The Shuttle explosion may have
opened the door to private industry, but a host of
problems remained.5
In the aftermath of the Challenger incident, President
Reagan issued a strong directive which severely limited
commercial access to the government space launch sys-
tems.5 The President declared that "[c]ommercial and
foreign payloads will not be launched on government
owned or operated ELV systems except for national se-
curity or foreign policy reasons. '5 3 In addition, commer-
cial projects could use the Shuttle "only where those
payloads must be man-tended, require the unique capa-
bilities of the [Shuttle], or ... [when needed] for national
security or foreign policy purposes. 54
With the loss of the Challenger from the four orbiter
fleet, the U.S. space program reevaluated its position in
the commercial market and proposed commercial ELVs as
an alternative to the Shuttle.5 5 For over thirty years
unique payloads earning a spot on later Shuttle flights. Id. at 132. NASA bumped
the remaining unqualified payloads from the Shuttle manifest. Id..
49 Leonard Sloane, The Shuttle Explosion: Cost of Insurance In Space May Rise, N.Y.
TiMES, Jan. 29, 1986, at A10. The Challenger tragedy dramatically rocked the
space insurance industry, but mishaps with two Titan 34D's, two Arianes, a Delta,
and an Atlas/Centaur in the same period also contributed to skyrocketing premi-
ums. Heydon, supra note 29, at 140.
50 See Sanger, supra note 46, at A19.
5' See, e.g., infra notes 149-160 and accompanying text. "The nation faced an
acute shortage of launch capacity, created by a policy that had fostered reliance on
the now-grounded Shuttle fleet, and exacerbated by a virtual absence of commer-
cial launch providers." Martin Marietta Memorandum, supra note 3, at 9.
52 Yelton, supra note 18, at 119 (citing Presidential Directive on National Space
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NASA worked to perfect the design of ELVs, which are
cheaper and less complex than the Shuttle. 56 ELVs offer a
high reliability rate, proven by thousands of commercial
and military launches. The technology of ELVs was
within reach of the private sector, but questions regarding
liability and insurance continued to plague industry
growth.I
E. INSURING THE NEW SPACE ENTREPRENEUR
While the space launch industry experienced dramatic
changes in the late 70s and 80s, the space insurance busi-
ness tried to keep pace. 9 Government space endeavors
typically rely on self-insurance by assuming the high risks
of a space launch.60 The U.S. government often chooses
to absorb any losses arising under the Federal Tort
Claims Act 6' or under one of the various international
treaties promulgated by the United Nations and ratified
by the Senate. 62 The emergence of the severely under-
funded space entrepreneur, however, created a necessity
for space insurance.63 Space operations are extremely
costly, and private enterprise is neither willing nor capa-
ble of bearing the cost of losses resulting from a space
launch mishap. 64 As the private space launch industry
grew, the space insurance industry also grew to meet the
56 Irene Atney-Yurdin, Insuring Third Party Liability for Commercial Outer Space En-
terprises, 3 INT'L PROP. INv. J. 325, 326 (1987).
57 Id. at 326-27.
58 REPORT OF THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPOR-
TATION ON THE COMMERCIAL SPACE LAUNCH ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1988, S. Doc.
No. 593, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 4-6 (1988) [hereinafter SENATE REPORT].
-9 See Johnson, supra note 21, at 248-53 (discussing the development of satellite
insurance coverage).
- Id. at 247.
6- 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (1988). Under the Federal Tort Claims Act the govern-
ment waives its sovereign immunity and becomes liable for its torts or the torts of
its agents under local law in the place where the tort occurred. Id.; see W. PAGE
KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAw OF TORTS § 131 (5th ed. 1984).
62 See infra part III.B.
63 Johnson, supra note 21, at 247.
64 Over a span of 21 months during 1984 and 1985, space launch and in-orbit
losses involved seven satellites with combined insured values of approximately
$600 million. Satellite Insurance and Space Commercialization: Hearings Before the Senate
[58
SPACE LA UNCH TORTS
escalating need for financial protection.6 5
Private companies require insurance to cover third-
party losses resulting from launch activities.66 Under the
various international treaties, third-party liability attaches
to the launching state.67 For this reason, the United
States traditionally compels private commercial enter-
prises to indemnify the government from potential third-
party claims. 68  As an example, a typical NASA launch
agreement requires a user to obtain a certain level of
third-party liability insurance. 9
Satellite owners also require insurance to cover prop-
erty losses.70 Property insurance for satellites developed
in discrete steps with each new type of insurance covering
more aspects of the life of the satellite. The first satellite
insurance policy, written in 1965 for Communications
Satellite Corporation (COMSAT), 7' covered damage only
to the satellite prior to liftoff.72 COMSAT purchased an
expanded insurance policy in 1969 for its Intelsat III
satellites to cover any losses incurred within forty-five
days following the launch.73 In 1975 RCA purchased the
Subcommittee on Science, Technology and Space, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 50 (1985) [here-
inafter Senate Space Insurance Hearings].
65 Rod Margo, Some Aspects of Insuring Satellites, 681 INS. L.J. 555, 556 (Oct.
1979).
6 Johnson, supra note 21, at 253.
67 Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects,
opened for signature Mar. 29, 1972, 24 U.S.T. 2389, 961 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter
Liability Convention].
- Gerald J. Mossinghoff, Managing Tort Liability Risks in the Era of the Space Shut-
tle, 7J. SPACE L. 121, 122 (1979).
69 Ralph L. Kissick, Commercial Space Launch Contracts: Disputes and Remedies, 4 J.L.
& TECH. 31, 38 (1989).
70 Johnson, supra note 21, at 248.
71 COMSAT is a quasi-private organization authorized to "plan, initiate, con-
struct, own, manage and operate ... a commercial communications satellite sys-
tem." 47 U.S.C. § 735(a)(1) (1988). COMSAT operates for profit, but the
President appointed the incorporators and three of the 15 directors. Id. §§ 731-
733.
72 Margo, supra note 65, at 556.
71 Id. at 556 n.4. The policy insured the loss of one satellite out of a series of
five, with a one satellite deductible. The definition of loss in satellite coverage is
crucial and typically involves physical damage and failure to achieve a specifically
defined orbital injection. Id.
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first satellite life insurance policy to cover one of its
SATCOM satellites for a period of three years, with a pos-
sibility of renewal.74 The satellite insurance companies
continue to offer more comprehensive policies, but the
soaring cost of this insurance threatens future commercial
developments in space.75
III. WHO'S TO BLAME?
The liability of commercial space launchers for custom-
ers' property losses involves several competing theories of
recovery. Following traditional tort law, a commercial
launch company may be strictly liable for property loss,
since a space launch may constitute an abnormally dan-
gerous activity. 76 On the other hand, international treaty
obligations suggest an approach to liability that applies a
negligence standard to commercial launch companies.77
In contrast, governmental space launch activities fre-
quently limit recovery to the specific provisions in the
launch services contract. 78 Finally, public policy suggests
additional limitations on the liability exposure of the
fledgling commercial launch industry.79
A. STRICTLY TORTS
A person is strictly liable for damage caused by a thing
or activity that is unduly dangerous, considering the inap-
propriateness of the thing or activity in the immediate sur-
roundings.80 To date, no American court has applied this
doctrine of strict liability espoused in Rylands v. Fletcher to
the carriage of goods into outer space. Several decisions,
however, imposed strict liability on persons conducting
ground tests of rocket motors and test firings of rockets
74 Johnson, supra note 21, at 251-52 n.36.
75 Id. at 267-68.
76 See infra part III.A.
77 See infra part III.B.
78 See infra part III.D.
79 See infra part IV.C. for a discussion of the public policy to promote the com-
mercial space launch industry.
0 See Rylands v. Fletcher, L.R.-E. & I. App. 330, 340 (H.L. 1868).
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within the atmosphere.8 ' In the 1930's, the developing
airline industry limited strict liability for abnormally dan-
gerous activities to damage to third-parties and property
on the ground. 2 Even today, airplane operators are not
strictly liable for harm caused to passengers and goods on
the aircraft. 3 By analogy, and relying solely on common
law tort principles, commercial space launchers are not
strictly liable for damage to or loss of a customer's
payload. 4
B. NEGLIGENCE THROUGH INTERNATIONAL TREATIES
Beginning with the launch of the Soviet satellite Sput-
nik on October 4, 1957, the international community rec-
ognized the need for laws governing activities in outer
space.8 5 To achieve this, the United Nations formed the
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space
(COPUOS) in 1959 to draft and adopt treaties governing
the use of space.86 As a permanent body of the United
Nations, COPUOS promulgates major space treaties, the
most recent being the Agreement Governing the Activi-
ties of the States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies
(Moon Agreement). 7  Each successive offering of
81 An excellent discussion of these cases appears in Charles L. Deem, Liability of
Private Space Transportation Companies to Their Customers, 51 INS. COUNS. J. 340, 350-
353 (1984) (citing Berg v. Reaction Motors Division, 181 A.2d 487 (N.J. 1962);
Smith v. Lockheed Propulsion Co., 56 Cal. Rptr. 128 (1967); and H.L. Properties,
Inc. v. Aerojet-General Corp., 331 F. Supp. 1006 (S.D. Fla. 1971)).
82 See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 520 cmt. b (1938).
Is A comment to the more recent RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS states:
An operator or owner of an aircraft is subject to strict liability under
this Section only for physical harm to land, or to persons or chattels
on the ground. He is not subject to liability under this Section to
persons themselves participating in aviation, such as the crew or pas-
sengers of a falling plane, or the owner of property on it or to per-
sons on another plane which was struck by the defendant's plane.
Different tort rules govern his liabilities to them.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520A cmt. e (1976).
- Deem, supra note 81, at 354.
85 See S. Neil Hosenball, Relevant Treaties Governing Space Activities, 38 FED. BAR
NEWS &J. 128, 128 (Apr. 1991) [hereinafter Hosenball Treaties].
86 G.A. Res. 1472 (XIV) (Dec. 12, 1959).
87 Agreement Governing the Activities of the States on the Moon and Other
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COPUOS attracts fewer ratifying countries, and the
United States probably will never ratify the Moon Agree-
ment because of the chilling effect on commercial ex-
ploitation of space resources.88 The earlier and widely
accepted treaties, however, still play an important role in
establishing international liability for space launch
mishaps.89
The Outer Space Treaty9" attaches international re-
sponsibility for national activities in space, whether gov-
ernmental or nongovernmental. 9 1  The Treaty
contemplates private space activities and requires the
states to assume full responsibility, regardless of their ex-
ercise of control over these activities. 92 The Treaty, how-
ever, fails to specify a standard to determine the
responsibility of a launching state or a procedure to com-
pensate the aggrieved party for damages.
The Liability Convention defines more clearly the re-
sponsibility of the launching state arising from Article VII
of the Outer Space Treaty and outlines a specific proce-
dure to compensate injured parties. Under the Conven-
tion, individuals have no standing to bring claims against
foreign governments, but must rely on their governments
to pursue relief.93 The Convention defines a launching
state as one that "launches or procures the launching of a
space object" or one "from whose territory or facility a
space object is launched. ' 94 A launching state is abso-
Celestial Bodies, opened for signature Dec. 5, 1979, 18 I.L.M. 1434 [hereinafter
Moon Agreement].
88 Dula, supra note 17, at 177.
89 See Hosenball Treaties, supra note 85, at 130-31 (providing a brief synopsis of
existing space treaties and the present status of acceptance by countries).
9 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and
Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, opened for
signature Oct. 10 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter Outer Space
Treaty].
9' Id. art. VI-VII, 18 U.S.T. at 2415, 610 U.N.T.S. at 209.
92 Id.
93 Stanton Eigenbrodt, Out to Launch: Private Remedies for Outer Space Claims, 55J.
AIR L. & CoM. 185, 196 (1989).
Liability Convention, supra note 67, art. I, 24 U.S.T. at 2392, 961 U.N.T.S. at
189.
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lutely liable for damages caused by its space object on the
surface of the Earth or to an aircraft in flight.9 5 In all
other cases, the liability is based on fault. 96 This two-tier
standard of liability established in the Convention sug-
gests negligence as one possible theory of recovery for
losses to a customer's payload caused by a commercial
space launcher. 97 If the damage from an American launch
occurs in the United States, then the Liability Convention
does not apply,98 and the injured party must find a rem-
edy in traditional tort law or, if the defendant is a govern-
ment agency, under the Federal Tort Claims Act.99
Actual recovery under the provisions of the Liability
Convention for third-party claims is very rare. From the
launch of Sputnik in 1957 to 1984, the space nations have
placed over 17,000 objects into Earth orbit. 00 All orbit-
ing objects eventually fall back to earth. Normally, this
space debris burns up on reentry with some notable ex-
ceptions. For example, inJanuary 1975, the second stage
of an expended Saturn V rocket accidently splashed down
in the Atlantic Ocean near the Azores. Similarly, the re-
mains of the eighty ton Skylab littered the Indian Ocean
and certain remote sections of western Australia.' 0 ' The
Soviet Cosmos 954 satellite crash in Canada, however, is
the only incident involving liability payments for damage
to persons or property caused by a falling space object.0 2
9- Id. art. II, 24 U.S.T. at 2392, 961 U.N.T.S. at 189.
96 Id. art. III, 24 U.S.T. at 2392, 961 U.N.T.S. at 190.
97 Deem, supra note 81, at 355.
98 Liability Convention, supra note 67, art. VII, 24 U.S.T. at 2395, 961 U.N.T.S.
at 191.
- Esposito, supra note 36, at 162.
00 William F. Causey, Insurance Coverage for the Space Industry, 20 TRIAL 43, 43
(Aug. 1984). By 1984 the geostationary orbit 22,300 miles above the equator
contained over 5600 objects. Craig Covault, Station Likely to Be Hit By Debris, Avi.
WK. & SPACE TECH., Sept. 17, 1984, at 16.
10, A litigious individual filed suit in a district court in Ohio to enjoin the return
of Skylab. S. Neil Hosenball, NASA and the Practice of Space Law, 13J. SPACE L. 1, 6
(1985).
102 Canada: Claim Against the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for Damage
Caused by Soviet Cosmos 954, reprinted in 18 I.L.M. 899 (1979) [hereinafter Cana-
dian Claim]; see Joseph A. Burke, Convention on International Liability for Damage
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A portion of the five ton surveillance satellite containing
an on-board nuclear power source survived reentry and
scattered debris in Canada's remote Northwest Territo-
ries. 0 3 The Soviets paid three million Canadian dollars in
full settlement of the claim.' 04 The Cosmos 954 incident
suggests the remote possibility of damage to third-parties
resulting from launch activities, but the more likely, and
cumulatively more devastating, financial losses are to the
payload itself.'0 5
COPUOS also ratified other space treaties with only mi-
nor impact on commercial launch operations. The Regis-
tration Convention created a national registry of space
objects. 0 6 The Rescue Agreement implements Article V
of the Outer Space Treaty and details the procedures and
obligations in the event an astronaut or space object lands
outside the territory of the launching state. 0 7 In addition,
the Moon Agreement prohibits a territorial claim of the
Moon by any nation, 0 8 provides free and open access to
the Moon by all nations, 0 9 and creates an organizational
framework for regulating the development of space re-
sources." t0 The International Telecommunications Con-
vention I ' and the Agreement Establishing the
International Telecommunications Satellite Organization
Caused by Space Objects: Definition and Determination of Damages After the Cosmos 954
Incident, 8 FORDHAM INT'L LJ. 255, 278 (1984).
103 Canadian Claim, supra note 102, at 902-03.
104 Canada's Claim Against the U.S.S.R. Arising Out of the Cosmos 954 Inci-
dent. The Claim's Settlement, Communique No. 27, Department of External Af-
fairs, Apr. 2, 1981.
105 Intelsat sought $400 million in damages from Martin Marietta for the loss of
a single satellite. Hofmann, supra note 1, at 3; Martin Marietta Memorandum,
supra note 3, at 15.
106 Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space, opened
for signature Jan. 14, 1975, 28 U.S.T. 695, 1023 U.N.T.S. 15.
107 Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the
Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space, opened for signature Apr. 22, 1968,
19 U.S.T. 7570, 672 U.N.T.S. 119.
108 Moon Agreement, supra note 87, art. XI, para. 2, 18 I.L.M. at 1438.
109 Id. art. VI, para. 1, 18 I.L.M. at 1436.
1o Id. art. XI, 18 I.L.M. at 1438.
III International Telecommunications Convention, opened for signature Oct. 25,
1973, Malaga-Torremolinos, 28 U.S.T. 2495.
SPACE LA UNCH TORTS
(Intelsat)112 also affect commercial activities in space, but
do not address launcher liability.
The collection of international agreements executed by
the United States affects private corporations involved in
launch activities in three ways." 3  First, the treaties
adopted by COPUOS and ratified by the United States are
considered self-executing and become the positive law of
the country. 114 Second, the United States compels corpo-
rations to comply with international law through NASA
launch agreements or through the licensing procedures of
the CSLA." 15 For example, the United States imposes
substantial restrictions regarding indemnification and in-
surance upon corporate space activities in response to the
liability established by the Outer Space Treaty and the Li-
ability Convention." 6 Finally, the two-tier approach in
the Liability Convention establishes negligence as the
leading theory of recovery for losses to customer property
caused by the launching company.' 17
C. THE GOVERNMENT STEPS IN
Under the Liability Convention, commercial launcher
liability for customer losses lies in negligence, but section
308 of the National Aeronautics and Space Administra-
tion Authorization Act (NASAct) may also impact the lia-
bility of launching activities."' Congress passed section
308 of the NASAct in 1980 to give NASA the authority to
112 Agreement Establishing the International Telecommunications Satellite Or-
ganization, opened for signature Aug. 20, 1971, 23 U.S.T. 3813.
I's JamesJ. Trimble, The International Law of Outer Space and its Effect on Commercial
Space Activity, 11 PEPP. L. REv. 521, 561-62 (1984).
14 U.S. CONST. art. VI (the Supremacy Clause); see Whitney v. Robertson, 124
U.S. 190, 194 (1888) ("By the Constitution a treaty is placed on the same footing,
and made of like obligation, with an act of legislation.").
115 42 U.S.C. § 2451 (d)(7) (1988) (prime directive of NASA is "[c]ooperation by
the United States with other nations"). The amended CSLA considers the obliga-
tions of the United States created by the various international treaties through the
insurance and indemnity provisions. 49 U.S.C. app. § 2615 (1988).
116 Mossinghoff, supra note 68, at 122.
1,7 Deem, supra note 81, at 355.
Il National Aeronautics and Space Administration Authorization Act, Pub. L.
No. 96-48, 93 Stat. 345 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2458b, 2459, 2473 (1988)).
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insure its users and provide indemnity for third-party
claims in excess of the insurance limits." t9 Section 308,
however, permits NASA to limit indemnification "to
claims resulting from other than the actual negligence or
willful misconduct of the user."'' 2 0 NASA does not act as
an insurer, but as an agent purchasing insurance when
available and providing this coverage to users.' 2 ' This ar-
rangement allows the user to purchase insurance at a rea-
sonable cost to cover most losses, while the United States
receives indemnification for all but the most serious inci-
dents. 22 Section 308 therefore encourages corporations
to enter the industry, but also allows the United States to
comply with its international obligations. 123  Congress
eventually adopted this government indemnification con-
cept of section 308 in the Amendments to the CSLA. 24
D. THE CONTRACT Is KING
In addition to the insurance requirements under sec-
tion 308 of the NASAct, the government often mandates
the signing of launch service or launch facility agree-
ments. 25 These agreements shift liability established by
international treaties to the private commercial
enterprise.
Public policy against adhesion contracts often prohibits
a party from limiting its liability. 26 Courts define a con-
119 Id. § 308 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2458b (1988)).
120 NASAct, supra note 118, § 308(b).
121 Johnson, supra note 21, at 261.
122 Id. at 261-62.
123 Id. at 253, 261-62.
12,4 49 U.S.C. app. § 2615(b)(1) (1988).
25 Both NASA and the Air Force employ model agreements to assure interna-
tional obligations are met and to allow further risk allocation. Furthermore, gov-
ernmental agencies often inject provisions into these contracts that support
certain public policies. See, e.g., Appalachian Ins. Co. v. McDonnell Douglas
Corp., 262 Cal. Rptr. 716, 723 n.4 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (a launch services agree-
ment providing that the parties must agree to a no-fault, no subrogation, in-
terparty waiver of liability to "contribute to the common goal of meaningful
exploration of outer space.").
126 Vera Bolgar, The Contract of Adhesion: A Comparison of Theory and Practice, 20
AM.J. COMP. L. 53, 54-55 (1972).
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tract of adhesion as a form contract imposed by a party
with superior bargaining power over a weaker party,2 7
which generally arise in consumer, rather than commer-
cial, settings. 28 Considering the amount of money in-
volved and the sophistication of parties, a commercial
launch service agreement normally does not constitute an
adhesion contract. 129
Since parties in the commercial space launch arena
freely allocate their liability through contracts, it is crucial
to clearly define the participants, the types of risks in-
volved, and the means to allocate those risks. The partici-
pants include: (1) the launch service provider, (2) the
customer or owner of the payload to be launched, (3) the
launch facility provider, and (4) the various contractors
and subcontractors.13 0 The participants face both a risk to
their own property and employees and a risk of legal lia-
bility for loss or injury to other participants or third-
parties.'13
The allocation of these risks appears primarily in two
agreements. A launch facility agreement often requires
the launch service provider to indemnify the government
for property damage and third-party liability in return for
the use of the government-owned and operated launch fa-
cility.'3 2 In contrast, a launch service agreement embod-
ies all of the rights and obligations between the launch
provider and the customer, including inter-participant
waivers of claims.' 3 3
NASA adopted a similar launch service agreement for
commercial users at Cape Canaveral, Florida and Wallops
Island, Virginia, 134 while the Air Force drafted a model
127 Id.
128 Richard P. Sybert, Adhesion Theory in California: A Suggested Redefinition and Its
Application to Banking, 11 Lov. L.A. L. REV. 297, 303 (1978).
- Appalachian, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 731.
1so Peter D. Nesgos, The Challenges Facing the Private Practitioner: Liability and Insur-
ance Issues in Commercial Space Transportation, 4 J.L. & TECH. 21, 23 (1989).
is, Id.
132 Id. at 24.
1ss Id. at 23-24.
1s4 Kissick, supra note 69, at 32. Although NASA creates a new contract for each
8151993]
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contract for users of the Patrick and Vandenberg Air
Force bases.' 3 5 A typical NASA launch service agreement
requires all parties, including the U.S. government, to ex-
ecute mutual covenants not to sue. 136 All participants in
the launch must hold each other harmless for any dam-
ages to the payload, launch vehicle, or launch facilities. 37
NASA requires this cross-waiver of liability for several
policy reasons.' 31 First, NASA hopes to encourage use of
the Shuttle by eliminating the user's concerns over mas-
sive liability claims arising from damage to the Shuttle or
other payloads.' 39 Second, NASA realizes the difficulty to
the insurance market in covering space ventures without
these cross-waiver provisions. 40  Finally, NASA believes
mutual covenants encourage participation of small scien-
tific users, such as small university researchers, who would
otherwise be unable to carry the liability insurance
needed to cover the risk of damage on launch.' 4 ' In
amending the CSLA in 1988, Congress adopted many of
customer, a typical launch service agreement is NASA's Martin Marietta Commer-
cial Titan, Inc. contract of Oct. 1988. For a good discussion of this contract see id.
at 32-42. The Appalachian court discusses in detail the exculpatory clauses in a
NASA launch services agreement with Western Union. Appalachian, 262 Cal. Rptr.
at 720-25. The Hughes case also discusses the unique contractual relationship be-
tween a customer and NASA. Hughes Communications Galaxy, Inc. v. United
States, 26 Cl. Ct. 123, 132-46 (1992).
"15 Kissick, supra note 69, at 32; Air Force's Model Expendable Launch Vehicle
Commercialization Agreement, Revision Two, July 1989 [hereinafter Air Force
Model Agreement].
1.6 Sheila Footer, Legal Issues and Answers for Commercial Users of the Space Shuttle,
13 TRANS. LJ. 87, 93 (1983).
I7 Id.
138 Johnson, supra note 21, at 256. The Shuttle's capability to carry several
satellites concerned customers since they then had to consider the potential liabil-
ity for causing damage to other expensive payloads. Appalachian, 262 Cal. Rptr. at
724. NASA, therefore, required all launch participants to sign a no-fault, no sub-
rogation interparty waiver of liability. Id. at 724 n.6 (quoting the full text of the
interparty waiver of liability in the NASA/Western Union launch services
agreement).
139 See Mossinghoff, supra note 68, at 123.
140 S. Neil Hosenball, The Space Shuttle in Perspective, 9J. SPACE L. 69, 72 (1981).
141 Mossinghoff, supra note 68, at 123. Many small scientific payloads could fly
on the Shuttle for $10,000, but additional insurance costs in the absence of cross-
waiver provisions may exceed $50,000. See Robert A. Tepfer, Allocation of Tort
Liability Risks in the Space Shuttle Program, 23 A.F. L. REV. 208, 213 (1982).
SPACE LA UNCH TORTS
the provisions in a typical NASA lauch service agreement,
including the cross-waivers of liability. 142
IV. THE COMMERCIAL SPACE LAUNCH ACT
A. A RACE TO PRIVATIZATION
NASA's substantial efforts to reduce the liability expo-
sure of its customers through the launch service agree-
ment did not apply to purely private launches. 143 As a
result, private industry still faced two major hurdles in the
race to privatization. The first hurdle, illustrated by the
difficulties surrounding the Conestoga I launch, con-
cerned the confusing state of piecemeal regulation im-
posed on purely private launch activities. 144 In 1984
Congress responded with the original CSLA to consoli-
date all licensing authority in a single regulatory body. 145
The second hurdle, aggravated greatly by the Challenger
disaster and other commercial rocket launch failures, was
skyrocketing space insurance rates and continued concern
for the exposure of private industry to potentially massive
liability. 146 Adopting many of NASA's ideas, Congress ac-
ted quickly by amending the CSLA in 1988 to include lim-
its on required insurance, government indemnification for
large claims, and mandatory cross-waivers of liability.' 47
B. HURDLE ONE AND THE ORIGINAL ACT
A collection of vague international treaties and a non-
standard set of government launch contracts controlled
the duties and obligations of parties in launches before
142 49 U.S.C. app. § 2615(a)(I)(C)-(D) (1988).
14, A launch provider, operating a purely private launch, drafts its own launch
service agreement.
'44 See infra part IV.B. and accompanying text for the regulatory nightmare of
the Conestoga I.
14- 49 U.S.C. app. §§ 2601-2623 (1988).
146 Andrew Ritholz, International and Domestic Regulation of Private Launching Ven-
tures, 20 STAN. J. INT'L L. 135, 172 (1984). "[E]xorbitant insurance requirements,
severe government review of price and service offerings, standards rejecting rela-
tively high risk practices, or stringent disclosure of results requirements may lead
some entrepreneurs to abstain from participation." Id.
14, 49 U.S.C. app. § 2615 (1988).
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the Conestoga I. A purely private activity would be sub-
ject to the same international obligations, together with
the regulations of a host of agencies, having only indirect
control on launch operations. 48 Space Services, Inc., in a
valiant effort to abide by all treaty obligations and agency
regulations, waded through a regulatory morass before
launching the Conestoga I in 1982.149
The players in the Conestoga I game read like a laundry
list of major governmental agencies. The Department of
State, in addition to overseeing the government's obliga-
tions under several international treaties, exercised its au-
thority under the Arms Export Control Act' 50 by
requiring a permit for the export of rockets, spacecraft,
space electronics, and guidance equipment. 15 ' DOT
maintained control of airspace over 14,500 feet and there-
fore required an exemption for rocket travel pursuant to
the Federal Aviation Act of 1958.152 DOT also required
launch participants to provide detailed information con-
cerning the launch within twenty-four to forty-eight hours
of liftoff.'5 3 The U.S. Coast Guard, exercising authority
under the Ports and Waterways Safety Act, 5 4 kept vessels
away from the launch site and trajectory and oversaw the
transportation of the rocket from the Texas mainland to
Matagorda Island. 155 The Conestoga I launch also re-
quired temporary licenses to operate the telemetry, track-
ing, and self-destruct systems over certain frequencies
allocated by the FCC under the Federal Communications
Act of 1934.156 In addition, NASA, the Department of
Commerce, the Department of Defense, the Air Force, the
148 Allen D. Webber, Launching the Rocket Industry in the United States: Domestic Reg-
ulation of Private Expendable Launch Vehicles, 50J. AIR L. & CoM. 1, 9-22 (1984).
149 Yelton, supra note 18, at 119-25; Webber, supra note 148, at 9-22.
-5 22 U.S.C. §§ 2751-2796d (1988).
151 See Art Dula, Export Controls Affecting Space Operations, 51 J. AIR L. & COM. 927,
944-47 (1986).
152 49 U.S.C. app. § 1301 (1988).
153 14 C.F.R. § 101.25 (1992).
154 33 U.S.C. §§ 1221-1236 (1988).
'55 Id. §§ 1223(c), 1225.
'56 Yelton, supra note 18, at 123 (citing 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-609 (1988)).
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Navy, the North American Aerospace Defense Command,
the IRS, the CIA, and even the U.S. Treasury justified
some measure of control over the Conestoga I launch.'5 7
All told, the regulatory approvals necessary to launch
the Conestoga I concerned eighteen federal agencies and
twenty-two different statutes or regulatory guidelines. 58
The approval process took six months to complete at a
cost of $250,000.1'9 The government imposed this "un-
necessary and potentially crippling regulatory barrier" for
a simple test flight carrying a water payload. 60 Accord-
ingly, the Secretary of Transportation urged Congress
and the President to "streamline and facilitate all clear-
ance requirements, eliminate any unnecessary and over-
lapping regulations and take steps to promote and
encourage what promises to be a multi-billion dollar
space launch business."' 16 1
The CSLA codifies the major policies of Executive Or-
der No. 12,465,62 which designated DOT as the lead
agency for commercial space launch regulation and imple-
mented a one-stop licensing procedure. 63 The CSLA at-
tempts to relieve the problems created by the brick wall of
"overlapping inter-agency jurisdiction" found in the Con-
estoga I launch. 164 The Executive Order empowered
DOT to act as the center for documentation of license ap-
plications, but did not empower DOT to issue licenses.
165
Congress passed the CSLA to insure that the clear policy
157 Id. at 123-25.
158 Senate CSLA Hearings, supra note 39, at 66.
159 Id.
10 Webber, supra note 148, at 26.
161 Statement by Elizabeth Dole, Secretary of Transportation, Expendable
Launch Vehicle Order Ceremony, The White House (Feb. 24, 1984).
162 Exec. Order No. 12,465, 49 Fed. Reg. 7211 (Feb. 24, 1984), reprinted'in 42
U.S.C. § 2465 note (1988).
163 Id.; 49 U.S.C. app. §§ 2601-2623 (1988). The success of DOT in deregulat-
ing other modes of transportation may have weighed heavily in the President's
decision. Ross, The Department of Transportation's New Role in Commercializing Space
Transportation, 1 ABA FORUM ON AIR AND SPACE LAW 5, 5 (1984).
164 Yelton, supra note 18, at 137.
165 Exec. Order No. 12,465 §§ 2(a)-(h), 3 C.F.R. 163 (1984), reprinted in 42
U.S.C. § 2465 note (1988).
1993] 819
820 JOURNAL OF AIR LA WAND COMMERCE [58
of the Executive Order would continue across administra-
tions and to affirmatively grant exclusive authority to the
Secretary of Transportation to issue commercial launch
licenses. 66
The CSLA applies to both commercial launches on gov-
ernment-operated systems and commercial launches, like
the Conestoga I, in which the government does not par-
ticipate. 167 In addition, the CSLA eliminates the question
of whether a regulatory agency can control the activities
of the space launch industry based solely on a collection
of international treaties and agreements. 168 In legislating
the CSLA, Congress still gave "serious consideration to
the extent of U.S. jurisdiction and the extent of U.S. liabil-
ity for launch-related activities pursuant to international
law and international obligations."'169 The purpose of the
CSLA is:
(1) to promote economic growth and entrepreneurial ac-
tivity through utilization of the space environment for
peaceful purposes;
(2) to encourage the United States private sector to pro-
vide launch vehicles and associated launch services by sim-
plifying and expediting the issuance and transfer of
commercial launch licenses and by facilitating and encour-
aging the utilization of Government-developed space
technology; and
(3) to designate an executive department to oversee and
coordinate the conduct of commercial launch operations,
to issue and transfer commercial launch licenses authoriz-
ing such activities, and to protect public health and safety,
safety of property, and the national security interests and
the foreign policy interests of the United States. 70
Pursuant to the power to "encourage, facilitate, and
- 49 U.S.C. app. § 2606 (1988).
167 Id. § 2605(a). The CSLA does not, however, apply to launches of govern-
ment payloads on government systems. Id. § 2620(c).
- Esposito, supra note 36, at 161.
169 S. REP. No. 656, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1984), reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5328, 5336.
170 49 U.S.C. app. § 2602 (1988).
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promote commercial space launches by the private sec-
tor," ' 7' the Secretary of Transportation established the
Office of Commercial Space Transportation (OCST). 7 2
OCST "exercise[s] the Secretary's authority to license
and otherwise regulate commercial space launch activities
and ... discharge[s] the Secretary's responsibility to en-
courage, facilitate and promote commercial space
launches by the United States private sector."' I7 This
new governing body publishes regulations establishing
procedures to review and authorize commercial launch
activities. 174 OCST licensing contains two separate proce-
dures. First, the Safety Review concerns the safety and
reliability issues of the applicant's vehicle and launch facil-
ities.175 Second, the Mission Review addresses the foreign
policy and national security interests impacted by each
launch. 76
OCST actively pursues other work to insure the success
of the commercial launch industry. For example, the pri-
mary function of OCST is to license and regulate com-
mercial launches. 77  Under the auspices of DOT,
however, the agency also conducts safety research and
oversees possible development of privately owned
spaceports. 178
The congressional findings in the CSLA declare that
the private sector is capable of providing private satellite
launch services, which would complement the services
available from the government.' 79 To this end, the
,71 Id. § 2604(a)(1).
172 14 C.F.R. § 401.1 (1992). OCST began operation on November 16, 1983,
but the Secretary of Transportation did not officially establish the agency until
February 24, 1984. Myers, supra note 22, at 43. One commentator concludes
that the establishment of the OCST "is the most appropriate method of streamlin-
ing the regulatory process." Webber, supra note 148, at 47.
17s 14 C.F.R. § 401.3 (1992).
174 Id.
175 Id. § 411.5.
176 Id. § 411.7.
177 Id. § 411.1.
178 Stephanie Lee-Miller, Licensing and Regulating U.S. Commercial Space Launches,
4J.L. & TECH. 45, 46 (1989).
179 49 U.S.C. app. § 2601(4) (1988).
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United States encourages development of the commercial
launch industry and commits to regulate these activities
only to comply with obligations under international trea-
ties and "to protect the public health and safety, safety of
property, and national security interests and foreign pol-
icy interests of the United States."' 80
Under the CSLA, the Secretary of Transportation en-
courages, facilitates, and promotes the commercial launch
industry, consults with other agencies over the licensing
requirements for commercial space ventures and main-
tains a system of licensing procedure that is fair and equi-
table to all applicants.' 8" The Secretary can issue,18 2
transfer, 8 3 modify, 184 suspend,"' and revokerS8 licenses.
In addition, the Secretary may prescribe new require-
ments, 8 7 waive applicable laws and regulations on a case-
by-case basis, 8 and issue any other regulations to carry
out the purposes of the CSLA. 8 9 Furthermore, to en-
force the provisions of the CSLA,9'° the Secretary can in-
vestigate and seize any objects, records, or reports subject
to the CSLA,' 9' require the presence of observers at any
production facilities, assembly sites, launch sites, or
launch facilities 19 2 and assess and enforce civil penalties
for violations of the CSLA. '3
The CSLA also encourages, through lease, sale, or
other transaction, the private use of government launch
facilities and services. 94 The price for the use of this
180 Id. § 2601(7).
181 Id. § 2604(a).
182 Id. § 2606.
183 Id.
- Id. § 2609(b).
185 Id. § 2609(a).
186 Id.
187 Id. § 2607(b).
188 Id. § 2607(c).
189 Id. § 2612.
I" Id. § 2616(a).
19, Id. § 2616(b)(2)(B).
192 Id. § 2616(b)(2)(A).
193 Id. § 2618.
'94 Id. § 2614(a).
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property is the "fair market value."' 95 In cases other than
sale or transaction in lieu of sale, the responsible govern-
ment agency can only charge for direct costs," which in-
clude wear and tear on property and salaries of U.S.
civilian and contractor personnel. 96
All launches under the jurisdiction of the CSLA must
obtain a launch license. 97 Generally, the CSLA requires
no other license, 198 but the Secretary of Commerce and
the FCC retain additional licensing authority over certain
satellites.' 99 The applicant must properly identify the
payload and obtain the necessary payload license before
receiving launch authorization. 20 0  The Secretary of
Transportation prescribes all application procedures20'
and provides notice for delays in processing applica-
tions.2 °2 Whenever the Secretary suspends, revokes, or
modifies a license, the affected party has a right to no-
tice, 20 3 hearing, 20 4 determination on the record, 20 5 and ad-
ministrative and judicial reviews. 0 6
Finally, the CSLA's jurisdiction flows directly from the
international responsibility established in the Outer Space
Treaty and the Liability Convention.20 7 In signing these
treaties, the federal government is ultimately responsible
for damage to property and harm to citizens of other
countries20 8 and, therefore, has a duty to insure the safety
of all space launch ventures. Consequently, the CSLA re-
quires that the licensee have liability insurance "at least in
such an amount as is considered by the Secretary to be
195 Id. § 2614(b).
IN Id.
197 Id. § 2605(a)(1).
198 Id. § 2605(c)(1).
-9 Id. §§ 2605(b)(1), (c)(2).
soo Id. § 2605(b)(1).
201 Id. § 2608(a).
202 Id. § 2608(b).
200 Id. §§ 2608(b), 2609(d).
204 Id. § 2611(a).
205 Id.
2- Id. § 2611(b).
207 Id. § 2620(d).
-o Outer Space Treaty, supra note 90, art. VII.
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necessary for such launch or operation, considering the
international obligations of the United States. ' 20 9 The
Secretary prescribes the amount of insurance required af-
ter consulting with the Attorney General and appropriate
agencies. 2 10 The CSLA does not establish limits on liabil-
ity insurance, nor does it address government indemnifi-
cation provisions like those found in a typical NASA
launch service agreement. Moreover, the CSLA does not
require specific risk allocation agreements between the
parties.
Many of the details concerning the licensing process for
commercial space launches are left for agency regula-
tion.2 1 1 For example, OCST is authorized to promulgate
a detailed multilevel certification process to insure a high
degree of safety from all participants in a launch. 2  Un-
fortunately, the original CSLA provisions regarding risk
allocation and insurance are arguably too indefinite and
unworkable.2 3
C. HURDLE Two AND THE AMENDMENTS
The passage of the CSLA in 1984 successfully scaled
the first hurdle to privatizing the launch industry. None-
theless, the space insurance crisis and the deterring effect
of runaway liability still presented a formidable second
hurdle.21 4 Following the Challenger disaster and several
other launch failures, the private launch industry faced
near extinction despite the growing demand for launch
services. 2 ' 5 Therefore, in 1988 Congress amended the
21, 49 U.S.C. app, § 2615 (1988).
2 0 Id. § 2615(a).
21, Ritholz, supra note 146, at 152.
212 Some suggest a certification process similar to the existing process for air-
craft. Id. at 153; see also 49 U.S.C. app. §§ 1423-24 (1988) (aircraft certification
legislation).
21 See Yelton, supra note 18, at 134 (describing insurance and risk-sharing pro-
visions of the CSLA).
214 See Martin Marietta Memorandum, supra note 3, at 10-11 (describing "[t]he
magnitude of the liability and insurance problems that had prevented the growth
of the American commercial launch industry").
21.1 See supra part II.D.
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CSLA, relieving many of the problems related to space
insurance and liability. t6
Limitation of liability for developing industries is not a
novel idea. In 1929 the Warsaw Convention limited inter-
national air carriers' liability for damage to passengers
and luggage,217 and the Rome Convention later capped
responsibility for damage caused by aircraft to property
on the ground or to third-parties. 8 In 1978 the Supreme
Court upheld legislation 219 designed to encourage the nu-
clear power industry by limiting the accident liability of
utility companies. 2 Similarly, government efforts to
temper the anxiety of massive space liability claims would
encourage development of private space launch
ventures .22
In the 1920s and 30s, the young air transportation in-
dustry received a shot in the arm from air mail subsidies,
technology transfers from military programs, and subsi-
dies for the military reserve air transport fleet. 222 When
the U.S. Post Office decided to fly air mail, the govern-
ment created a new market for the young aircraft industry
and encouraged development of the legendary Douglas
Aircraft Company DC-3.223 More recently, the govern-
ment established an aviation insurance fund to cover un-
insurable risks associated with war, hijacking, and other
216 49 U.S.C. app. §§ 2601-2623 (1988); Martin Marietta Memorandum, supra
note 3, at 11 (Congress takes action to "kick start" the heavily burdened commer-
cial space launch industry).
217 Convention on International Carriage by Air, opened for signature Oct. 12,
1929, 49 Stat. 3000, T.S. 876, 2 Bevans 983.
21, The Convention on Damage Caused by Foreign Aircraft to Third Parties on
the Surface, Oct. 7, 1952, 310 U.N.T.S. 181.
219 Price-Anderson Act, Pub. L. No. 85-256, § 4, 71 Stat. 576 (1957), as amended
by Act of Sept. 29, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-2 10, § 1, 79 Stat 855 (1965) and Act of
Dec. 31, 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-197, §§ 2-14, 89 Stat 1111 (1975) (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 2210 (1988)).
220 Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Env't Study, 438 U.S. 59, 84 (1978) (upholding
legislation found to be rationally related to encouraging private development of
the nuclear power industry).
221 Dula, supra note 17, at 186.
222 Id.
225 Hudgins, supra note 31.
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terrorist activities.224 Similarly, a combined spaceflight in-
surance fund could offer protection to private industries
through substantial risk pooling.225
In its infancy, the nuclear industry encountered the
same cost-prohibitive insurance premiums that the com-
mercial space launch industry now faces. The Atomic En-
ergy Act of 1954226 ended the government monopoly in
the nuclear industry and left the door open for private en-
terprise. Utility companies refused to enter such a risky
field, so Congress passed the Price-Anderson Act227 to:
(1) protect the public by establishing a fund to cover acci-
dent claims and (2) protect the new commercial nuclear
industry by limiting potentially massive liability. 22 In par-
ticular, this legislation provides government indemnifica-
tion and liability limitations for the nuclear power
industry.229 The Price-Anderson Act also requires licen-
sees to purchase insurance in an amount established by
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.23 ° In turn, the
Commission indemnifies a licensee up to $500 million for
each nuclear accident.23' The CSLA Amendments con-
tain similar measures demonstrating a strong government
policy to encourage the burgeoning commercial space in-
dustry through legislation.232
The U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Science, Technology
and Space held hearings on November 7, 1985, to ap-
praise the status of insurance issues hindering develop-
ment of the commercial space industry. 33 During 1984
and 1985, space launch and in-orbit losses of seven major
224 49 U.S.C. app. §§ 1531-42 (1988).
22, Dula, supra note 17, at 186.
226 Atomic Energy Act of 1954, ch. 1073, § 68 Stat 919 (current version at 42
U.S.C. §§ 2011-2296 (1988)).
227 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (1988).
228 See S. REP. No. 454, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2251,2251.
229 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (1988).
2 0 Id. § 2210(a).
2 1 Id. § 2210(e).
2-2 49 U.S.C. app. § 2615 (1988).
23- Senate Space Insurance Hearings, supra note 64, at 1.
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satellites generated combined insurance claims in excess
of $600 million.2 34 The industry also experienced a major
setback in 1984 with the loss of two satellites on the Shut-
tle. 35 Since 1978, the accumulative loss ratio degraded to
approximately $840 million in losses compared to a mere
$430 million collected in premiums.236 As a result, satel-
lite insurance capacity of $250-300 million per launch in
1983, at a premium rate of five to seven percent of satel-
lite cost, decreased to $50-75 million in 1987, at premium
rate in excess of twenty to twenty-five percent of satellite
CoSt. 23 7 For a large commercial space venture, the finan-
cial feasibility of the mission severely diminishes when in-
surance costs exceed 2.5 percent of the expected gross
revenues. 2 38 In such a case, businesses may opt for com-
peting alternative technology on the Earth. 39
In September 1987, the House Committee on Science,
Space and Technology began hearings to assess the
health of the launch industry following the Challenger
disaster.2 40 For two years, not a single American satellite
customer had scheduled a launch date with an American
launch provider. 4 ' Prospective launch providers ex-
234 Id. at 50 (statement of Daniel E. Cassidy, Vice President, Marsh & McLennan
Aviation and Aerospace).
2-5 One satellite for the Indonesian government and one for Western Union
failed to reach their desired orbits due to a failure in each spacecraft's Payload
Assist Module (PAM). Natalie Angier, Rounding Up the Runaways, TIME, Nov. 26,
1984, at 22. The incident received international attention when a later Shuttle
flight attempted a daring recapture and salvage operation. Id. For a discussion of
the legal events following the loss of both telecommunication satellites, see infra,
parts V.A-B.
236 Senate Space Insurance Hearings, supra note 64, at 50 (statement of Daniel E.
Cassidy, Vice President Marsh & McLennan Aviation and Aerospace).
237 Id.
238 ECON, INC., FEDERAL GOVERNMENT PROVISION OF THIRD-PARTY LIABILITY IN-
SURANCE TO SPACE VEHICLE USERS, 105 (Jan. 2, 1985) (prepared for NASA under
Contract No. NASW-3339).
239 Id. at 98-99.
240 State of the Commercial Space Launch Industry: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Space Science and Applications of the House Comm. on Science, Space and Technology, 100th
Cong., I st Sess. 1, 9 (1987) (statement of George A. Koopman, President, Ameri-
can Rocket Company) [hereinafter Koopman Statement].
24, Lillian M. Trippett, Legislative Initiatives to Encourage Private Activity, 4 J.L. &
TECH. 49, 51 (1989).
1993] 827
828 JOURNAL OF AIR LA WAND COMMERCE
pressed concern over the potential liability and the inade-
quate guidance regarding insurance in the CSLA. 42 The
American launch industry also faced government subsi-
dized competition from the French, the Chinese, and the
Soviet Union.243 The House Committee, therefore, re-
viewed the launching practices of the Air Force and
NASA, searching for a way to help the struggling
industry.24 4
A few months prior to the House hearings, the govern-
ment issued a first draft of the Air Force Model Agree-
ment designed to regulate the private use of certain
national ranges for space launches.2 45 The commercial
launch industry voiced its reservations over the liability
insurance and risk allocation provisions. 46 The original
agreement requires launch users to assume risk for all
damages and to obtain the "aggregate maximum casualty
and liability insurance available on the world market. ' 241
The Air Force refused to set a specific amount of insur-
ance required or to offer indemnity for large losses.248
With little aid or guidance from the U.S. government to
help mitigate potentially massive losses, private industry
was hesitant to invest in space enterprises under the origi-
nal Air Force Model Agreement.249
In response to industry's outcry for more guidance, the
Air Force issued a revised model agreement in January of
1988.250 The new agreement requires the user to indem-
nify the government for any third-party claims arising
242 Id. at 51-52.
243 Katherine M. Gorove, The Commercial Space Launch Act Amendments of 1988: A
Brief Overview, 16J. SPACE L. 184, 185 (1988). The French Government and the
European Space Agency fully indemnify Arianespace for losses in excess of $70
million. Id. The Chinese Long March and Soviet Proton launches are completely
insured by the state. Id.
244 Trippett, supra note 241, at 51-52.
245 Koopman Statement, supra note 240, at 9.
246 Id. at 10.
247 Id.
248 Yelton, supra note 18, at 132.
249 Koopman Statement, supra note 240, at 10.
250 For a complete text of the Model Agreement, see Commercial Space Launch Act
Amendments of 1988: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Space Science and Applications of the
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from the production, marketing, and use of government
facilities or services, and for any environmental incidents
or related legal violations.251 In response to industry
complaints, the new agreement defines "maximum avail-
able insurance" as "the amount of insurance available in
the world market at a reasonable premium and on terms
considered commercially reasonable for the risks involved
to fund the User's responsibilities under the Agreement
.... 52 The revised agreement, however, still lacked
provisions for limitation of liability or government
indemnification.
Prior to the adoption of the CSLA, NASA also devel-
oped a risk apportionment scheme for its private custom-
ers.253 A typical NASA launch service agreement requires
the user to obtain the maximum available liability insur-
ance against third-party claims at a reasonable cost, and
NASA assumes responsibility for claims above the insura-
ble limit.2 54 In addition, NASA encourages "no-fault, no
subrogation, interparty waiver of liability" agreements to
cover damage to both government property and the
payload. 255 These agreements require parties to bear the
risk of damage or loss to their own property.256
House Comm. on Science, Space and Technology, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. app. 2 at 227
(1988) [hereinafter House Amendment Hearings].
251 Id. at 232 (art. IV, § c).
212 Id. (art. IV, § b(3)).
251 See id. at 11-13 (testimony of John E. O'Brien, General Counsel, NASA).
24 Id. In a Senate hearing, however, Mr. O'Brien, General Counsel for NASA,
stated that the private sector can provide the "requisite satellite insurance" and
stressed that NASA is not in the insurance business. Senate Space Insurance Hear-
ings, supra note 64, at 4-5.
255 House Amendment Hearings, supra note 250, at 12. The NASA waiver requires
parties to:
agree to a no-fault, no subrogation, interparty waiver of liability pur-
suant to which each party agrees not to bring a claim against or sue
the other party ... and agrees to absorb the financial and any other
consequences for Damage it incurs to its own property ... as a result
of participation in [Shuttle] Operations ... regardless of whether
such Damage arises through negligence or otherwise.
48 C.F.R. § 1852.228-72 (1984).
256 Appalachian Ins. Co. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 262 Cal. Rptr. 716, 723-
24 n.4 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989).
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The House Committee favored the successful practice
of the European space consortium, Arianespace, which
borrowed the NASA provisions and made it work for a
commercial enterprise.25 7 The Reagan Administration
unsuccessfully lobbied for additional amendments that
would protect the ELV industry through tort reform by
capping pain and suffering damages at $200,000.258 After
a heated debate that nearly killed the entire bill, Congress
adopted the risk-sharing provisions used by NASA.259
The CSLA required a licensee to obtain liability insur-
ance or demonstrate financial responsibility. ° Under
this scheme, several agencies exercised authority to set
the amount of liability insurance, which created confu-
sion in the ELV industry.2 6' The Amendments contain
very particular guidelines setting the maximum insurable
requirements for (1) third-party claims, (2) damage to
government property, and (3) cross-claims between par-
ties participating in the launch.262 Under this new legisla-
tion, the licensee must first demonstrate financial
responsibility or obtain third-party liability insurance not
to exceed the lesser of $500 million or the maximum lia-
bility insurance available on the world market at reason-
able cost. 26 3 Second, the licensee must demonstrate
financial responsibility or obtain insurance to cover loss
or damage to government property not to exceed the
lesser of $100 million or the maximum coverage available
257 Trippett, supra note 241, at 52.
258 See Launch Insurance Dispute Threatens Legislation, Avi. Wx. & SPACE TECH., Feb.
22, 1988, at 22.
259 49 U.S.C. app. § 2615 (1988). "The bill provides for a cross waiver of dam-
ages resulting from accidents which are not the result of the willful miscon-
duct.... This is exactly how we handled space shuttle launches .... " 134 CONG.
REc. 12,116 (daily ed. May 24, 1988) (statement of Rep. Walker, ranking minority
member on the House Subcomm. on Space Science and Applications). To ap-
pease the Administration's concern with subsidizing the industry, the Senate
amended the bill to sunset the government indemnity after five years. 49 U.S.C.
§ 2615(b)(5) (1988).
2- 49 U.S.C. app. § 2615 (1988).
261 Yelton, supra note 18, at 134.
262 49 U.S.C. app. § 2615 (1988).
263 Id. § 2615(a)(1)(A).
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at reasonable rates.2r 4 Finally, each licensee must sign re-
ciprocal waivers of claims with all participants, including
the government. 265 The Secretary of Transportation de-
termines the maximum probable loss of a particular
launch in consultation with the Administrator of NASA,
the Secretary of the Air Force, and the heads of other ap-
propriate agencies.26 6 In return for the licensee obtaining
liability insurance and signing cross-waivers, the United
States agrees to indemnify third-party claims in excess of
the maximum probable loss, but not more than $1.5
billion.267
Since the adoption of the Amendments, the DOT has
actively licensed individual launches and established in-
surance limits. Space Services, Inc. successfully launched
the Starfire rocket in March 1989 under the expedited li-
censing process of OCST.268 This first commercial launch
licensed under the amended CSLA flew a payload of six
scientific experiments for eight minutes over the White
Sands Missile Range in New Mexico.269 OCST required
Space Services to purchase a $10 million liability insur-
ance policy at a cost of $30,000.27 °
In September 1989, a McDonnell Douglas Delta rocket
launched a communications satellite, marking the first
completely private orbital launch under the Amend-
ments.2 7' OCST issued minimum insurance requirements
for McDonnell Douglas and later set limits for General
Dynamics and Martin Marietta launches.272 Not until the
loss of an Intelsat payload on a Martin Marietta Titan III
rocket was the policy behind the waivers challenged in
26 Id. § 2615(a)(1)(B).
265 Id. § 2615(a)(1)(C)-(D).
266 Id. § 2615(a)(1)(A).
267 Id. § 2615(b)(1).
268 Yelton, supra note 18, at 136 (citing Mark Carreau, Houston Firm's Rocket May




272 Edward H. Kolcum, U.S. Sets Insurance Minimums for Commercial Space
Launches, Avi. WK. & SPACE TECH., Jan. 30, 1989, at 69.
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court.2 7 3
V. BOTCHED LAUNCHES GO TO COURT
Few cases involving a space launch provider's liability
for a failed launch ever appear in court, but recently sev-
eral space law decisions shed light on the evolving law
governing commercial launch companies. Lexington Insur-
ance Co. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp. ,274 turning on events
and agreements signed before enactment of the CSLA,
demonstrates the unwillingness of courts to allow contrac-
tual limitations on the tort liability of launch providers. 7 5
A companion case, Appalachian Insurance Co. v. McDonnell
Douglas Corp.,276 expresses a different attitude, honoring
exculpatory clauses in launch service agreements involv-
ing large, sophisticated corporations contracting in a
highly specialized and risky new technology.277 Finally,
Martin Marietta Corp. v. International Telecommunications Sat-
ellite Organization278 represents the most recent judicial
treatment of the public policy announced in the
Amendments.279
A. LEXINGTON INSURANCE V. MCDONNELL DOUGLAS
On February 3, 1984, the Space Shuttle Challenger car-
ried two satellites, the Westar VI and the Palapa B-2, into
low Earth orbit. Each satellite relied on a Payload Assist
273 Martin Marietta Corp. v. International Telecommunications Satellite Org.,
763 F. Supp. 1327 (D. Md. 1991), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 978 F.2d 140 (4th Cir.
1992).
274 Stephen R. Ginger, The Trial of the Palapa B-2 Case: A Look at the Liability Issue
in Commercial Space Launches, 38 FED. BAR NEWS &J., 132, 132 (Apr. 1991) (citing
Lexington Ins. Co. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., No. 481713 (Cal. Super. Ct.,
Orange Co., May 1990)).
275 Id. at 134. "The court held simply that plaintiffs were entitled to assert a
negligence action under California law and that the risk allocation provision of
Perumtel's contracts did not prevent them from doing so." Id.
276 262 Cal. Rptr. 716 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989).
277 Id. at 730-31.
271 763 F. Supp. 1327 (D. Md. 1991), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 978 F.2d 140 (4th
Cir. 1992).
279 Id. at 1333 (district court disallowing any claims for negligence or even gross
negligence for customer property losses).
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Module (PAM) designed to boost the telecommunication
hardware into geosynchronous orbit, but both PAMs
burned out prematurely, leaving the satellites inoper-
able. 280 The owners of the two satellites, the Government
of Indonesia and Western Union, submitted insurance
claims for losses totalling $180 million. 8' Several insur-
ance companies then brought suit against McDonnell
Douglas, Morton Thiokol, and Hitco for subrogation of
the insurance claims.2 82
The court honored a contractual disclaimer of liability
and dismissed the Westar VI case. 83 Western Union
signed a disclaimer with McDonnell Douglas that covered
any failure of the PAM and disallowed any subrogation
suits by the insurers.2 8 4 The Palapa B-2 case survived dis-
missal, however, and became the first jury trial ever aris-
ing from the U.S. space program. 8 5
Since the launch occurred in February 1984, the CSLA
did not govern the parties in the Palapa B-2 case.28 6 In-
stead, the launch agreement between the Indonesian gov-
ernment and NASA contained a "no fault, no subrogation
interparty waiver of liability. 28 7 In addition, Perumtel,
Indonesia's wholly-owned communications company, bar-
gained with Hughes Aircraft Company for a lower satellite
price and expressly agreed to take title to the Palapa B-2
and assume the risk of loss. 288  Accordingly, Perumtel
purchased liability insurance in the event the Shuttle or
280 The Palapa B-I successfully reached geosynchronous orbit in June of 1983
using an identical PAM upper stage module.
28, Ginger, supra note 274, at 132.
282 Id.
282 Id.
28 Appalachian Ins. Co. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., No. 481712 (Cal. Super.
Ct., Orange Co., May 1990). A California appellate court affirmed the granting of
summary judgement to the defendants based on exculpatory clauses in the Mc-
Donnell Douglas/Western Union launch contract. Appalachian, 262 Cal. Rptr. at
718. See infra part V.B for a discussion of the Appalachian case.
285 Ginger, supra note 274, at 134.
286 Id. The CSLA took effect 180 days after enactment on Oct. 30, 1984. Pub.
L. 98-575, 98 Stat. 3064.
287 Ginger, supra note 274, at 132.
2a Id.
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PAM failed to deliver the Palapa B-2 to the proper geo-
synchronous orbit. 89
At trial, McDonnell Douglas argued that insurance
companies could not recover on a negligence theory be-
cause Perumtel agreed to assume the risk of loss. McDon-
nell Douglas also asserted that interparty waivers of
liability prohibited all parties from suing each other over
losses resulting from the launch. The court concluded
that the specific risk allocation provisions in Perumtel's
contracts did not prevent the insurers from bringing a
negligence action under California state law.2 90 The jury
heard detailed evidence of negligent design and testing of
the PAM and concluded that the defendants were not lia-
ble.29' The jury did, however, find that Morton Thiokol
breached a warranty covering the PAM rocket motor and
awarded the insurers $37,500, the pro rata share for re-
placing the motor.2 9
Aside from being the first space jury trial in the United
States, Lexington illustrates an unwillingness to allow freely
negotiated contractual limitations on liability to preclude
a negligence action .29  The CSLA, and particularly the
Amendments concerning reciprocal cross-waivers of lia-
bility, were enacted several years after the events giving
rise to Lexington.29 4 Later, in Martin Marietta, the district
court dismissed claims for negligence and gross negli-
gence relying primarily on the congressional public policy
behind the Amendments.295
B. APPALACHIAN INSURANCE V. MCDONNELL DOUGLAS
The Westar VI satellite, which accompanied the Palapa
B-2 on the ill-fated flight of the Challenger on February 3,
289 Id. at 132-33.




2- 49 U.S.C. app. § 2615 (1988).
295 Martin Marietta, 763 F. Supp. at 1333-34.
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1984, was the subject of another suit.296 Five of the insur-
ers that paid Western Union $105 million for loss of the
Westar VI later brought suit against McDonnell Douglas,
Morton Thiokol, and Hitco for negligence and strict prod-
ucts liability. The trial court honored the exculpatory
clauses in the McDonnell Douglas/Western Union service
contract and granted summary judgement in favor of the
defendants.29 7 The appellate court affirmed. 9 8
On appeal, Appalachian argued that summary judge-
ment should not have been granted because the waiver
provisions in the McDonnell service contract are "ambig-
uous, unconscionable, against public interest, do not re-
flect the parties' true agreement, and unlawfully
disclaimed strict products liability. ' 299 Appalachian main-
tained that the interparty waiver clause included in the
McDonnell contract contained language similar to the
waiver in the NASA launch service agreement with West-
ern Union. The intent in drafting and adopting the excul-
patory language in the McDonnell contract, Appalachian
claimed, was to incorporate the same interparty waivers
required by NASA in all Shuttle flights.3 0 0 Since NASA's
interparty waiver did not preclude a claim between a
Shuttle customer and its own contractors, Appalachian ar-
gued that the McDonnell contract similarly allowed a sub-
rogation suit brought by Western Union's insurers against
McDonnell Douglas and its subcontractors.
The court ruled that although the NASA and McDon-
nell agreements contained similar language, they were not
identical.3 0 ' The McDonnell agreement, explained the
court, accomplished the policy behind the NASA in-
2- Appalachian Ins. Co. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 262 Cal. Rptr. 716, 718
(Cal. Ct. App. 1989).
-7 Id. at 718.
298 Id.
29 Id.
300 Id. at 724-25. NASA required an interparty waiver of liability among cus-
tomers to encourage use of the Shuttle without incurring liability for damage to
other customers' payload. Id.
-1 Id. at 725.
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terparty waivers, but also included other clear limita-
tions.3 °2 One of these limitations prevented Appalachian
and the other insurers from suing McDonnell Douglas
and its subcontractors. 0 3
Appalachian also asserted that the same exculpatory
clauses were not a "commercially reasonable allocation of
risk" and were thus unconscionable. °4 The court re-
sponded that when negotiating a contract involving spe-
cialized services in a high risk business it was not
"unreasonable for the parties to agree Western Union
would obtain insurance... rather than to have McDonnell
Douglas warrant performance of the upper stage
rocket. 3 0 5 The court, in affirming the lower court deci-
sion, emphasized that this was "not a standardized adhe-
sion contract but the result of a voluntary agreement." ' 6
C. MARTIN MARIETTA V. INTELSAT
Martin Marietta Corp. v. Intelsat3 0 7 represents the first ju-
dicial effort to interpret new provisions in the Amend-
ments that require participants to execute reciprocal
waivers of liability.308 The district court concluded that all
actions in tort, including gross negligence, are waived in
light of the strong congressional policy to encourage the
private launch industry.30 9 This strong interpretation of
congressional intent is a departure from launching prac-
tice under a typical NASA launch service agreement or the
Air Force Model Agreement, typified by the Lexington
case,3 10 and poses several questions regarding the future
of the commercial space launch business.3 '1
302 Id.
303 Id.
304 Id. at 730.
303 Id. at 731.
30- Id. at 734.
307 Martin Marietta, 763 F. Supp. at 1327.
s08 49 U.S.C. app. § 2615 (1988).
3- Martin Marietta, 763 F. Supp. at 1334.
310 Lexington Ins. Co. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., No. 481713 (Cal. Super.
Ct., Orange Co., May 1990).
3-1 Martin Marietta, 763 F. Supp. at 1334.
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In August 1987 Intelsat and Martin Marietta entered
into a contract to launch two satellites on Titan III rock-
ets. 1 2 Martin Marietta agreed to launch the satellites in
return for a fixed payment from Intelsat of $112 million to
launch each satellite.' 1 3 Shortly after liftoff of the first
launch, the payload's separation system failed to eject the
satellite and its orbital booster. Intelsat engineers eventu-
ally separated the payload from the rocket, but the delay
left the satellite in a useless orbit.3 1 4 Experts estimated
the cost to rescue the satellite and place it in a proper or-
bit was $90 million.1 5 Martin Marietta filed for declara-
tory judgment in the district court of Maryland and
Intelsat counterclaimed, asserting breach of contract. 6
In addition, Intelsat brought negligent misrepresentation,
negligence and gross negligence claims in an effort to re-
cover damages for lost profits, lost use of the satellite, and
rescue CoStS.
3 1 7
Martin Marietta first argued that the Amendments re-
quire parties to execute reciprocal waivers of liability, ef-
fectively preempting Intelsat's three tort claims against
Martin Marietta.' 18  Martin Marietta also urged that the
312 Commercial Launch Services Contract Between Martin Marietta and Intel-
sat, Contract No. MMC-CTS-87-001 INTEL-629 (August 10, 1987) [hereinafter
Launch Contract] (on file with The Journal of Air Law and Commerce).
313 Martin Marietta stresses that they were to furnish launch services for a fixed
price and that they "shall be deemed to have completed the Launch Services for
each Launch under this Contract upon the intentional ignition of the Titan III
solid rocket motors." Id. art. 5.
314 Martin Marietta Memorandum, supra note 3, at 14; Intelsat Memorandum,
supra note 4, at 2.
315 Martin Marietta, 763 F. Supp. at 1329.
316 In a later unpublished opinion, the district court dismissed Intelsat's claims
for breach of contract. See Martin Marietta, 978 F.2d at 142. The Fourth Circuit
later revived the contract claims, finding ambiguity in the launch service contract
definition of "mission failure." Id. at 143.
"'7 Intelsat also specifically challenged Martin Marietta's reliance on the
Amendments as "misplaced," noting that the Amendments were enacted "one
full year after the Contract was signed." Intelsat Memorandum, supra note 4, at 4.
318 Martin Marietta stated their argument in a memorandum to the court:
The Commercial Space Launch Act prohibits Intelsat from bringing
claims for property damage or loss against Martin Marietta, and
preempts all state law that is inconsistent with the Act's provisions or
purposes. The Act and its amendments articulate a national policy
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strong policy announced in the Amendments imputes
cross-waiver provisions to the launch contract. In addi-
tion, Martin Marietta asserted that Congress intended the
waiver provisions in the CSLA, standing alone, to pre-
empt all state tort claims brought in connection with the
launch contract.
The court determined that Congress passed the
Amendments to the CSLA, including the cross-waiver
provisions, to "encourage industry expansion in a rapidly
shrinking market.13 9 The court explained that many
commercial ventures cannot afford insurance to protect
themselves from potentially massive tort actions, so Con-
gress requires cross-waivers of liability in the licensing
procedure .32  The cross-waiver provisions, the court rea-
soned, are only a condition to receive the license l.3 2 The
fact that OCST issues a license that does not meet this
condition does not suggest that the license automatically
adopts the waiver provisions. 2 The court therefore re-
jected Martin Marietta's argument that the Amendments
impute such waivers.3 2
The court then emphasized that the remaining claims of
negligent misrepresentation, negligence, and gross negli-
gence can only survive if Intelsat established a duty be-
yond the launch service contract.3 2 4 Normally, duties in
tort arise from the efforts of the state to protect a vulnera-
ble party. 5 Since both parties are equally sophisticated
in allocating their own risks, the court deferred to specific
language in the contract to define Martin Marietta's lim-
that supports the growth and development of a private-sector com-
mercial launch industry. Intelsat's claims conflict with the explicit
language of the Act and are inconsistent with its purpose. There-
fore, they must be dismissed.
Martin Marietta Memorandum, supra note 3, at 34-35.





324 Id. at 1331.
325 Id.
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ited duties to Intelsat.3 2 6
Intelsat then argued that the warranty disclaimer provi-
sion in the launch service agreement did not apply to rep-
resentations made after the contract, and therefore did
not shield Martin Marietta from liability. The court
stressed that both parties were equally sophisticated and
that their relationship was purely contractual.3 " In the
absence of "an express duty of due care in making repre-
sentations," the court found that the claim for negligent
misrepresentation after signing the contract could not
stand.38
Intelsat alternatively conceded an action in ordinary
negligence because there were contractual waivers in the
launch agreement, but contended that any waivers as to
gross negligence were against public policy. 2 9 In re-
sponse, the court reasoned that since Congress amended
the CSLA to require such cross-waivers, the public policy
on this issue was clearly pronounced by legislation.3 3 0 Ac-
cording to the court, the legislative history of the Amend-
ments showed that Congress intended mandatory waivers:
(1) to limit the total universe of claims that might arise as
a result of a launch; and (2) to eliminate the necessity for
all of these parties to obtain property and casualty insur-
ance to protect against these claims.3 3 1 The court con-
cluded that since the Amendments require parties
involved in space launch activities to bear their own
losses, allowing claims for negligence and gross negli-
gence would undermine clear legislative intent and se-
verely burden the space launch industry.3
326 Id. at 1332.
327 Id. at 1332-33.
328 Id. at 1333.
329 Intelsat states that "even unambiguous contractual provisions which do pur-
port to relieve a party from liability for tort may not, on public policy grounds, be
construed to relieve that party from liability for intentional, willful, or grossly neg-
ligent acts." Intelsat Memorandum, supra note 4, at 28.
3-0 Martin Marietta, 763 F. Supp. at 1333.
3s, Id. at 1333-34 (quoting S. REP. No. 593, 100th Cong., 2nd Sess. 14, reprinted
in U.S.C.C.A.N. 5525, 5538 (1988)).
332 Id. at 1331. The district court speculates that there may possibly be a duty
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The court's exclusion of gross negligence departed
from the effect of a typical NASA launch service agree-
ment and the Air Force Model Agreement. 3 Both agree-
ments contain explicit language excepting waiver of
liability for gross negligence or willful acts of the govern-
ment. Under the Air Force Model Agreement the con-
tractor assumes risk for all loss or damage "except as
waived by DOT or resulting from 'the reckless disregard
or willful misconduct of the United States or its
agents.' ,,334 A typical NASA launch service agreement
provides that the insurance coverage obtained by the con-
tractor "may exclude damage caused by the U.S. Govern-
ment's willful misconduct or reckless disregard." '"3 5
Under the reciprocal waiver provisions in the Amend-
ments, each party assumes responsibility for property
damage or loss from activities carried out under the
launch license. 36 The statutory language of the Amend-
ments requires cross-waivers for any damage or loss and
contains no specific exceptions for liability arising out of
gross negligence or even willful misconduct.33 7
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit reversed in part and af-
firmed in part, upholding the lower court's dismissal of
the negligence and negligent misrepresentation claims,
but reversing the dismissal of the contract and gross neg-
ligence claims.3 3 8 As to the contract claim, the court re-
viewed the dismissal de novo and found that the launch
contract is not free from ambiguity when viewed in the
light most favorable to Intelsat.3 3 9 The court carefully an-
beyond the contract terms not to "intentionally, willfully or fraudulently abandon
the contract." Id.
-s3 See supra notes 134-42 and accompanying text.
34 Kissick, supra note 69, at 38 (quoting Air Force Model Agreement, Art. IV.
c.2).
33- Id. at 38-39 (quoting NASA Sample Contract, Art. IV, 3.b).
336 SENATE REPORT, supra note 58, at 14. The report clearly states that the cross-
waivers of liability "shall stipulate that each party is responsible for any property
damage or personal injuries that it sustains." Id.
33, Kissick, supra note 69, at 37-38.
338 Martin Marietta, 978 F.2d at 141.
339 Id. at 143.
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alyzed the launch contract itself and the Interface Control
Document, a separate agreement detailing the design and
operation of each launch, and found an ambiguity in the
definition of "mission failure. 3 40 The court also found
that the interplay between Article 6 of the launch con-
tract, which specified a replacement launch as the exclu-
sive remedy, and Article 17, which placed damage caps on
all other claims, was "far from crystal clear." 3 4 1
As to the negligent and negligent misrepresentation
claims, the Fourth Circuit agreed with the lower court's
reasoning that no duty of care in tort arose out of the con-
tract or out of the unique relationship of the parties.3 42
Since the parties are equally sophisticated and their only
relationship is contractual, no express duty of care arises
out of the contract.3 43 Similarly, the relationship between
Martin Marietta, a large aerospace company, and Intelsat,
an international telecommunications giant, does not pres-
ent circumstances where the law imposes a duty of due
care independent of the contract. 3 " Therefore, the ap-
pellate court upheld the dismissal of the negligent and
negligent misrepresentation claims. 4
Finally, the Fourth Circuit refused to follow the district
court's adherence to a congressional intent evident in the
Amendments to protect parties from liability for their own
gross negligence. 46 The court first noted that the con-
tract was signed before enactment of the Amendment and
added, in dicta, that even if the Amendments applied ret-
roactively, there is no evidence of congressional intent to
waive gross negligence claims.3 4 7 The Fourth Circuit re-
versed the gross negligence dismissal, relying on a Mary-
540 Id. Martin Marietta argued that failure of the satellite to separate was a
"mission failure" leaving Intelsat with the sole remedy of a replacement launch.
Id.
s., Id,
342 Id. at 144.
'43 Id.
344 Id.
34 Id. at 145.
546 Id. at 146.
347 Id.
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land court of special appeals case,3 48 which found that a
contract cannot waive liability for gross negligence.
The Fourth Circuit reaffirmed the lower court's empha-
sis of the launch contract as the basis of liability between a
satellite owner and a launch company. The court, how-
ever, refused to allow a waiver of gross negligence claims
despite the strong language of the Amendments support-
ing an underlying policy to encourage growth of the
American space launch industry. The Fourth Circuit may
have only cracked the door for tort recovery in space
launch mishaps, but this small glimmer of potentially mas-
sive tort liability may blind the vision of private space
entrepreneurs.
VI. CRIES FOR TORT SHOULD FALL
ON DEAF EARS
For years our government, through NASA and the Air
Force, dedicated large sums of money and took great risks
to develop the technology of space flight. The govern-
ment now wishes to transfer this technology and many of
the facilities to the private sector and allow economic
forces to shape the new industry. The small space entre-
preneur, overburdened by the piecemeal regulation of
private launches, urged Congress to pass the CSLA in
1984. Following the Challenger disaster and a breakdown
in the space insurance market, private launchers de-
manded relief from massive liability and expensive insur-
ance. Responding to this outcry, Congress amended the
CSLA in 1988. The effect of these legislative efforts went
essentially untested in court, until the district court and
Fourth Circuit decisions in Martin Marietta.
Martin Marietta emphasizes the importance of the
launch service agreement.3 49 Since all foreseeable private
348 Boucher v. Riner, 514 A.2d 485, 488 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1986).
349 Martin Marietta Corp. v. International Telecommunications Satellite Org.,
763 F. Supp. 1327, 1332 (D. Md. 1991), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 978 F.2d 140 (5th
Cir. 1992) ("Equally sophisticated parties who have the opportunity to allocate
risks to third party insurance or among one another should be held to only those
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launch activities will involve large and sophisticated com-
panies, the aggrieved party should not find relief beyond
the obligations specifically included in the launch con-
tract.,350 Each participant in the launch must allocate its
own risks, buy insurance, or make other contractual ar-
rangements to protect its investment.3 5 Anything can be
contracted, and in light of the mandatory reciprocal cross-
waivers of liability, there is a strong public policy support-
ing agreements to waive tort claims.3 52
The Fourth Circuit in Martin Marietta, however, rekin-
dled the tortious flame for claims of gross negligence.
The appellate decision overrules a policy followed by the
lower court denying any recovery in tort short of inten-
tional acts for a space launch mishap. Now an aggrieved
satellite owner, after following the mandates of the
Amendments to sign cross waivers of liability and
purchase insurance, can still allege gross negligence. This
window of opportunity to recover in tort provided by the
Fourth Circuit conflicts with the overall policy of the
Amendments to insulate the fledgling launch industry
from uncertain liabilities.
A legal system free of nonintentional tortious recovery
may arguably lead to a lack of assurance that the launch
provider will perform its obligations in good faith. The
customer is, however, assured of performance under the
contract in two independent ways. First, the licensing
procedure of the OCST insures a high level of technical
competency and safety. 53 Second, parties are free to con-
tract for any performance standards or contingency ar-
rangements if the launch provider does not supply
adequate services. Although the law of commercial space
launches announced in Martin Marietta relies primarily on
the private agreement between parties, the amended
duties specified by the agreed upon contractual terms and not to general tort du-
ties imposed by state law.").
350 Id.
351 Id.
352 Id. at 1333.
353 14 C.F.R. § 411.5 (1992).
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CSLA provides important checks through licensing and
insurance requirements. 5 4 The clear and resounding
spirit of the amended CSLA is that free enterprise and
freedom of contract now reign in the commercial space
launch industry.
Space offers great rewards, but only at great risk. To
encourage bold entrepreneurs to explore and exploit the
vast resources in the great beyond, Congress passed the
Commercial Space Launch Act in 1984 and later its
Amendments in 1988. The rules of the game that courts
should now follow are simple: enter at your own peril, al-
locate the risks in a contract, and do not scream "Tort!"
when something goes wrong.
354 49 U.S.C. app. § 2615 (1988).
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